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In this chapter I argue that the presence of ritualized performances in politics is not necessarily a sign of societal immaturity or corruption. In democratic societies ‘the people’ are in charge – but who they are and what they stand for is ambiguous, contested and subject to revision. The public staging of political claim and counterclaim may afford an opportunity for ‘the people’ to see itself and reflect upon who it is, has been and might become. In political spectacles the audience is part of the performance – it’s source and object - and through the act of judging may also become a subject. 

The chapter begins with some general reflections on the prevalence of ritualized political performances. I then examine some of the ways in which political theorists can be anxious about audiences, publics and peoples. In the context of a critical discussion of deliberative approaches to politics, and with reference to the rhetorical tradition of thinking, I argue that political audiences are not necessarily disempowered when being spoken at. A performer must to some degree tailor their performance to the outlook and interests of the publics they come before, and that audience then finds itself in a position to judge what it sees. From this perspective a task for analysis is the identification and specification of the traditions and modes, forms and genres, trends and tendencies of public political performance – the grammars which make it possible and the opportunities for their creative and even transformative use. 

Peoples are a Problem 

In Shakespeare’s tragedy of Coriolanus a great warrior is exiled from Rome, sides with its enemies, and dies without heroism at the hands of anonymous conspirators. The City, suffering terrible food shortages, is left weak and humiliated. In assigning responsibility for this critics of the play have pointed to the scheming and mendacity of the tribunes, the venality of the plebeians, and to politics itself – such a hopelessly compromising activity that none can participate without losing honour and integrity (see George 2004). Yet something else is also central to the action of the play and to the decisions that set in motion its terrible events: stage-fright. 

Martius (the hero of war with the Volscians) refuses to perform the role of ‘Coriolanus, Hero of War with the Volscians’. He expects to be spared from the ritual that confirms high office in front of the people (and to avoid wearing the ceremonial ‘gown of humility’). Sicinius, a tribune, insists: ‘Sir, the people/Must have their voices; neither will they bate/One jot of ceremony’; Menenius, Martius’ friend, urges him: ‘fit you to the custom and/Take to you, as your predecessors have/Your honour with your form’. Nevertheless, in the face of both public demand and the obligations of tradition, Coriolanus still complains ‘it is a part/That I shall blush in acting’ (Act 2, Scene 2). 

It is not only lack of willing that holds him back. Menenius explains that Martius is also incapable: 
‘Consider this: he has been bred i' the wars
Since he could draw a sword, and is ill school'd
In bolted language; meal and bran together
He throws without distinction…’ (Act 3, Scene 1). 

Perhaps it is this lack of skill that causes Martius to dislike so the occasions at which he must speak (and to despise the plebs who require it of him): ‘…I cannot bring/My tongue to such a pace’ (Act 2, Scene 3) he explains, and when forced to perform cannot refrain from insulting his audience. With the leader unable to play the role assigned to him the people cannot play theirs; the polis falls into crisis and politics gives way to war.

In telling this story Shakespeare put into dramatic form some things that should be taken very seriously by both political scientists and political theorists. First of these is the observation that a certain sort of public performance is a fundamental element of the societal art of politics. Contrary to the assumptions of conspiracy theorists power doesn’t hide itself away and conduct its business in private. It appears in public dressed in the appropriate costume (ermine robes, military fatigues, finely tailored suit) and saying the appropriate words. These rituals are often of relatively recent invention (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1992) but they are far from superficial phenomena – which takes us to the second thing Coriolanus brings before the eyes. Such spectacles are usually taken to be indicative of the vanity of the powerful (their desire or need to be seen) and a way in which they subject us (forcing us to admire them, to genuflect to their glory). We imagine an audience required to attend and applaud an endless parade of tanks and troops, or one whipped into a xenophobic frenzy by finery, pomp and the rhythm of words. But in the performances Martius disdains - and this is the reason he disdains them - the people, far from being manipulated are the manipulators. In them Martius is required to adapt himself to the people, to speak to their woes, to submit his person and his wounded body to their appraisal. 

In actual politics (as opposed to Shakespeare’s fictionalisation) there are many and varied examples of such a phenomenon – some of them rather like that portrayed in Coriolanus. The anthropologist Meyer Fortes, writing in the 1960’s and reflecting on rituals of political office, offered the example of Ashanti rites of succession. On assuming the position of King, Fortes explained, the candidate appears ‘before his people, he swears fidelity to them and is admonished by his senior councillors to remember, among other things, that he may never act without their advice and must rule with justice and impartiality’ (Fortes 1962: 59). In the United Kingdom there are many similar examples: the ‘investiture’ of new members of the House of Lords; Royal coronations; the annual opening of Parliament; commemorations of those killed in war. These rituals all involve (amongst other things) the uttering of a generic form of words. As in Coriolanus, an office holder is required to speak in public to an audience which can then pass judgement upon them. 

In a 1948 study of political organisation among Native Americans, Robert Lowie records a number of examples including this from Curt Nimuendaju reporting on the Sherente: 

‘On many evenings…I saw the chief assemble the village…stepping in front of the semicircle he would impressively and vividly harangue the crowd for possibly an hour. Usually he circumstantially explained the half-forgotten ceremonial of some festival…there followed a lengthy admonition...to preserve ancient usage. In conclusion he would urge all to live in peace and harmony’ (cited in Lowie 1948: 16).

What the Chief says is not of any immediate practical import; he issues no instruction, no call to arms, and he addresses no particular pressing matter. He delivers an ‘epideictic’ address - a demonstrative and ritualised celebration that adheres to an implicit generic template. The structure of power relations within such a ritual is more complicated than it first appears to be. Although formally the dominant character, the Chief is not acting autonomously. He is doing what tradition or habit compel. Furthermore, as anyone who speaks at a wedding or a prize-giving should know, public and ceremonial speech must communicate not what the speaker wants to say but what the audience expects and needs to hear. In order to remain as the Chief who gives these speeches the Chief has to say things the others won’t mind hearing. That is why Pierre Clastres has argued that in societies such as that of the Native Americans speaking is not a right of power but a duty. ‘Indian societies, do not recognise the chief’s right to speak because he is the chief’, Clastres wrote, ‘they require that the man destined to be chief prove his command over words. Speech is an imperative obligation for the chief. The tribe demands to hear him: a silent chief is no longer a chief’ (1990:153). For Clastres ‘The whole political philosophy of primitive society can be glimpsed in the obligation of the chief to be a man of speech’ (1990: 153). The chief is confined to the domain of speech, within which he owes talk to the group as a condition of his being chief. 

Echoes of this can still be heard in, for instance, the “Speech from the Throne” in which the British monarch, opening a new session of Parliament, is required to conform to ritual and deliver an address written by others about what they will do with a power the Crown can longer exercise.  Indeed, in contemporary democratic societies - despite the development of ‘rational-legal’ procedures and ‘contractual’ obligations regarding the successful delivery of ‘public services’ - the legitimacy of office still rests in part on the correct execution of ritualised speech moments. These are patterned occasions when a political leader (a general, a head of state or another office-holder) delivers a generic address that is attended to by a particular audience. In the United States such speech moments are clearly institutionalized: the inauguration speech; the annual State of the Union address; party convention speeches (see Jamieson and Campbell 1990).  In British Politics similar set-piece speech performances pepper the political calendar from Party conferences to necessary press appearances (see Finlayson and Martin 2008). During elections there are a variety of staged if unpredictable encounters with the public, victory and concession speeches, and as of 2010 there are leaders’ debates. At the heart of British Politics is the House of Commons in which ritualised divisions of time, symbolic props and rules specifying the locations and movements of individuals (Shechner 2003) make possible a variety of competitive performances between practitioners of a highly stylised form of speech. The House is a theatre for performances that are both histrionic and also agonistic (see Crewe 2010; Waylen 2010). 

All of these speech-rituals assign roles to participants, test or demonstrate the competence or authority of political actors and serve to affirm party, ideological or national identifications. They mark out boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, creating ‘a sense of ordered histories of institutions, appropriate modes of behaviour legitimised by performance and recognition over time’ (Rai 2010, 293). They are also opportunities for audiences to assess arguments, policies and character. Fitness to rule may be demonstrated through the delivery of a demonstrative epideictic speech that reaffirms the traditional ways of doing things – but unfitness may also be revealed and political actors exposed to the hostility, or indifference, of their audience. 

The latter is something we see in Coriolanus. The theme may not always be in the foreground but the play is an effective dramatisation of the potential power of the people. This has certainly affected its critics. Many in the nineteenth-century (perhaps aware of the demands of a restless ‘mass’) easily and happily condemned the plebeians ‘ungovernable licence and malignant ribaldry’ (Drake quoted in George 2004: 10). Writing in the 1960’s an altogether more liberal critic felt that Coriolanus was asking the same question as that which had recently and famously been posed by John F. Kennedy in Profiles in Courage: ‘What is the role of the man of principle in politics? Can he act, involve himself in the world, and retain his honor? Can he uncompromisingly stand by his principles and yet be a force in the world?’ (Rabkin 1966: 204). Rabkin sympathised with Martius’ feeling that the populace is ‘concerned only with what it can get for itself’, desirous only of a leader ‘willing and able to tailor himself’ to them. 

One might think that a starving populace is quite sensible to be concerned with getting things for itself, or that a free people is wise to try and contain its leaders (especially those skilled in the art of killing). Rabkin (who, to be fair, briefly notes that Coriolanus’ refusal to bend is ‘every bit as destructive’ as the venality of the plebeians) writes: ‘The citizens know it is a game they are asking Coriolanus to play, but his willingness to play the game would tell them that he is their man’. He then asks ‘Do we really want Coriolanus to play the game?’. The expected answer is clearly ‘no’ (1966: 208). Yet the play also poses a question which is the very opposite to that asked by Rabkin and Kennedy: Do ‘the people’ have a place in politics? Can they be a force in the world? And for some the horror of the play is that the answer it gives to this question is clearly ‘yes’. One of the things that public political performances can do – and which Shakespeare dramatises - is enable individuals to become, for a time, ‘a people’ and to take up a (quite possibly contentious) relationship not only with their leaders but also with their City and with themselves. 

From Critical Reason to Rhetorical Performance

That ‘the people’ are a problem is hardly a feeling confined to drama critics. Indeed, one might say that it is this problem (or, more precisely, the constitution of this as a problem) that gave birth (and continues to give birth) to political philosophy. If the question which animates political philosophy is ‘who should rule?’ then it is also ‘who should be ruled?’. Platonic political theory is motivated by hostility to the proposition that the people can and should have a say in political affairs – they are the object of rule, not its subject. And for this reason Plato’s political philosophy is concerned not only to prove the qualification of the philosophers to be Kings but also the disqualification of the people from such office. Here, effort is not primarily directed at showing that various kinds of individual lack the capacity to be a ruler but that en masse ‘a people’ cannot rule. Plato dislikes democracy’s noisy audiences ‘shouting or hammering their disapproval and approval – grossly exaggerated, in either case – of the things that are said and done’ (1987: 287). This is quite the opposite of the situation required for proper philosophical conversation. Patient dialectical exchange, the slow and arduous climb of concepts from the darkness of the cave to the clarity of light, best takes place between an older teacher and a younger pupil, away from the bustling city - and without an audience. 

We find something similar in contemporary theories of political deliberation which take their inspiration from the Kantian ideal of an enlightened public, freeing itself from its immaturity and employing public reason to regulate itself and its rulers. Kant explains in his famous essay addressing the question of enlightenment that he is concerned with the freedom ‘to make public use of one's reason in all matters’. This means, he clarifies, ‘that use which anyone may make of it as a man of learning addressing the entire reading public’ (my emphasis). Kant’s public is not gathered in a town square or civic hall where it might act as one. It is a public of isolable (and perhaps isolated) individuals united by their consumption of something new – printed literary journals and periodicals (see Laursen 1986; Habermas 1996). This new communicative technology enabled individuals to communicate their thinking publicly, and others to reflect upon it, even as everyone remained private. 

The thinking these private enlightened individuals were to do was above all ‘critical’ in nature. The task of criticism in Kantian thought is that of ‘determining and judging what is lawful in reason in general’; it is the ‘court of justice for all controversies of pure reason’ without which ‘reason is as it were in the state of nature, and it cannot make its assertions and claims valid or secure except through war’ (Critique of Pure Reason, A, 751–752). Like Plato, Kant does not care for the noise of the demos in the public square. He wants to clear it of polemicists, dogmatists and civic humanists (see Garsten 2006). And this way of thinking about publics and peoples has given rise to a tradition which, when it looks at the public sphere, sees untidiness – somewhere full of ill-made claims, unjustified assertions and badly schooled audiences. It wants to unclutter the public sphere so as to enable free individuals to commune with the General Will. The wager of deliberative political theory is that if the right procedures can be found and put in place, then the universal rules implicit in our conduct as rational individuals will manifest themselves and govern our decision-making which can then, finally, be sure of its own justice. In a sense, then, the Kantian approach isn’t really about deliberation. It is about engendering a situation in which (unhindered by the corruptions of public performance) what would always have been the right answer is able to appear. 

This has given rise to a very particular way of conceiving of the problem of ‘the people’ in politics, and especially in democracy. Deliberative political theory thinks in terms of a number of separate ‘objects’: a speaker or orator of some kind, an audience and a text. The orator may not be a single figure – it may be an institution or medium of communication, an expert, a politician, another citizen or some other public figure; similarly the audience may be imagined as composed of everybody in a polity or some part of it, a literal or imagined community; the ‘text’ may be the articulation of a specific proposal or counter-proposal, an argument of some kind, or it may be conceived of as communication in the abstract. With these three elements in play the task of the political theorist is to arrange them in the right way so as to ensure the right outcome – to line them up so that none is in charge over the others, none can dominate, and in combination they will sound harmonious. Very often this involves subtracting other elements – the mass media, venal demagogues, an uneducated people and so on. 

For example, deliberative theorist Simone Chambers has proposed a distinction between two kinds of public communication: ‘deliberative’ and ‘plebiscitary’ rhetoric. The latter Chambers finds to be a ‘pathology’ of large scale democracies. It consists of ‘speech that is concerned first and foremost with gaining support for a proposition and only secondarily with the merits of the arguments or persuasion for that matter’ (2009: 337). Such language is not so much rabble rousing as ‘strategic’. Chambers associates it with contemporary campaign techniques (opinion polling to identify the median voter, psychological research to establish ‘trigger’ words and powerful ‘framing’ devices). Where deliberative rhetoric ‘engages citizens’ practical judgment’, treating them as capable deliberators, plebiscitary rhetoric ‘seeks to attract voters and as such treats its audience as a means to power’ (2009: 337). Instead of being properly dialogical it is monological.

Like Plato, Chambers is worried by ‘the size and unruliness of the mass public’ which replaces mutual deliberation with asymmetrical and mediated communication (2009: 339). ‘In democracies, where the sheer numbers of supporters is an important factor’, she writes, ‘plebiscitary rhetoric is always a threat to deliberative ideals’ (2009: 337). To redress this imbalance she advocates an increase in opportunities for citizen-to-citizen encounters of a ‘semi-Socratic’ kind – smaller, back-and-forth exchanges freed from the pressures of a mass audience. These, she believes, can make citizens more capable, better able to evaluate oratory and experienced in the ‘skepticism, self-confidence, and knowledgeable judgment’ that are required of them (2009: 341). For Chambers, then, the problem of the people in politics is addressed by breaking up large publics so that individuals can experience something which makes them better. At the same time public communication must take a complementary form. The end results will be more just and rational societies. However, I suggest, it will also be the end of ‘the people’. 

Chambers and other deliberative theorists are not wrong to be concerned with the ways in which contemporary political performances are forced into moulds manufactured by strategy consultants or confined to speech genres defined by cable news channels. But she and they start from a misconception of the situations in and through which political communication and rhetoric take place. Deliberativists tend to write as if in politics one seeks to convince an opponent. A more common scenario is that one tries to beat an opponent in front of an audience. In an election one is not trying to win the votes of the other parties but to win from them the votes of the electorate. In a formal debate the efforts of the proposers of the motion to make a better case than their opponents are judged not by the opponents but by the audience before them. This, presumably, is exactly what some deliberative theorists would like to expunge from the polis. But in abolishing it one would abolish the audience also. And that, I suggest, would be a problem. For in such disputations, while orators may not engage in explicit dialogue with either their opponents or the audience, it is not the case that they are merely engaging in a monologue. Public talk is always polyphonic and in such situations something altogether more complicated is happening.    

Rather than think of speaker, topic and audience as isolated elements awaiting their correct organisation by the political philosopher I would like to propose that we conceive of them as parts of one thing: a performance. A performance certainly includes those elements and they are clearly identifiable. But they exist only as things in relation to each other. A person on a platform reciting talking points in three part lists is not (yet) an orator and a crowd standing around in a the square is not (yet) an audience. These cannot come together without a ‘text’ – something to argue about and a form or genre that enables the parties to recognise that this is what they are doing. The performance is not only what happens on the stage. It is the entire occasion, a specific arrangement of all the elements within it. In so constituting the performance as the object of analysis we are not, I think, removing it from its context. The relations inside the performance – including those between speakers, audiences and texts – remain a concern. Also of importance is the relationship of the performance to other performances of the same sort (and of which it may be one iteration) and also performances of different kinds (for deliberation is not the only show in town).

Viewed in this way such performances are ‘rhetorical situations’ (Bitzer 1999) – combinations of people, events and problems which may be changed in some way by performative discursive acts. Prior relations between speaker, audience and the topic, dispute or issue at hand comprise a history that bequeaths a ready made vocabulary, perhaps a genre of speech; a more general staging organises the subjects and objects of rhetorical action. That organisation of speech affects speakers just as it affects audiences. 

Plato wanted rulers to learn virtue and wisdom and then apply it to the polis. The rhetoricians wager that through learning to perform in civic life one might become good at living it. As Isocrates, the great teacher of rhetoric, declared: 

‘I consider that the kind of art which can implant honesty and justice in depraved natures has never existed and does not exist, and that people who profess that power will grow weary and cease from their vain pretensions before such an education is ever found. But I do hold that people can become better and worthier if they conceive an ambition to speak well, if they become possessed of the desire to be able to persuade their hearers’ (Antidosis 272-76). 

And for this reason, where Plato opposed imitative performance – learning ‘what a man and what a woman ought to say, and what a freeman and what a slave ought to say, and what a ruler and what a subject’ (Ion 504b) - the rhetorical tradition has embraced it. 

The classical teachers of rhetoric had their students learn great speeches and invent examples of the kind of speech one might find in this or that situation, not so as to confine them to convention but so as to provide them with resources on which to draw when seeking to act within or upon concrete situations (Haskins 2000). In learning them one learned the contours and folds of civic space. For Isocrates, as Ekaterina Haskins puts it, ‘by identifying with what fictional and historical characters say and do, a student grasps the repertoire of social roles and the range of situations more fully than does a person who receives lessons in moral philosophy without “living” its principles’ (2000: 21). Similarly Cicero’s ideal orator is not simply one who ‘on any matter whatever can speak with fullness and variety’ (De Oratore 1, xiii, 59) but one whose eloquence is rooted in philosophy and in an understanding of the history, tradition, and laws of the community to which they speak. They must be a person of the city, familiar with people’s attitudes, customs and ways of communicating – one who masters ‘everything that is relevant to the practices of citizens and the ways humans behave: all that is connected with normal life, the functioning of the State, our social order, as well as the way people usually think, human nature and character’ (De Oratore 1, xi, 48). To learn to perform as a political actor is also to learn about the community and thus to become tied into it. That can, of course, generate only a politics of conservation dedicated to celebrating, maintaining and policing the borders of the community – of who is in it and of what can be thought and said within its world. But what one learns through imitative performance is the multifarious modes and means through which persons in action may create and employ meaning - the ‘grammars’ of public communication; a thick and nuanced grasp of a particular culture, community and context. And, just as grammar is a means and mechanism for policing the limits of a language it is also a tool for making it say new things. The ability to understand and interpret the ways and means of a particular polity is a necessary skill for any who want to change it. 

A Mirror for Peoples

As we have seen, deliberative theories are worried by audiences – by a public acting as a collective rather than as a series of individuals. Thus deliberative procedures not only constrain speakers – they also school audiences, drawing them into the correct use of the criteria of judgement. Rhetorical performances also, potentially, provide a kind of schooling for audiences – but in a very different way. To see why we have to understand a little more about how rhetoric works, and about what it is that a rhetorician is performing. 

For Aristotle the most essential aspect of rhetoric was not emotion or figurative language but enthymemes. These are not – as is sometimes thought – inadequate, false or truncated forms of reasoning. The enthymeme is that kind of logical argument which draws on ‘notions possessed by everybody’ (Rhetoric 1355a). Note here that Aristotle says ‘everybody’ and not ‘anybody’. He does not mean for a rhetorician to rely on just any opinion but on ‘those accepted by our judges or by those whose authority they recognize’ (Rhetoric 1395b). Lines of argument emerge from the interaction between the one advancing an argument with those to whom it is addressed. 

Bitzer (1959) explains enthymemes in terms of the ways in which they form and use argumentative premises. In scientific, analytical, reasoning premises are laid down by a speaker (‘Let x = 10’). In dialectical reasoning (such as that exemplified in Socratic dialogue) they are asked for and must be agreed to. In rhetorical enthymemes, Bitzer argues, ‘the speaker does not lay down his premises but lets his audience supply them out of its stock of opinion and knowledge’ (Bitzer 1959: 187). Where dialectic involves a direct question and answer, between participants in rhetoric there is an implied question and answer: ‘enthymemes occur only when speaker and audience jointly produce them’, and they unite speaker and audience in a process in which ‘Owing to the skill of the speaker, the audience itself helps construct the proofs by which it is persuaded’ (1959: 188). From this perspective rhetorical activity invokes a hermeneutic circle in which an interpretation of an audience by a speaker generates premises which are in turn interpreted by that audience, recognized (or not), and responded to (or not). As the contemporary rhetorical theorist Thomas Farrell expresses it, rhetoric involves the implementation of practical wisdom ‘through the complementary participation of someone else: namely the rhetorical audience’ (Farrell 1993: 73), and because appeals to that audience must be adapted to what that community already thinks – to its extant values and principles – through rhetoric ‘the norms and conventions of a culture find themselves employed as premises of both recognition and inference’ put to the test and collectively practiced (Farrell 1993: 76). 

What the rhetor attempts to perform, then, is a ‘fusion of horizons’ between what an audience already thinks in general and what she thinks it ought to think about some particular issue, exigency or action. This fusion is ‘demonstrated’ through performance. The enthymematic appeal to reason is combined with the appeal to ‘ethos’ – the character of the speaker, a performance aiming at ‘identification’. This involves speaking in a style and tone congruent with the demands or expectations of the audience, employing emotive force in decorous ways (Burke 1969). Such identification, the ‘emotional connection of audience with actor and text’ may create ‘the conditions for projecting cultural meaning from performance to audience’ (Alexander 2006: 55). As Turner put it (cited by Alexander) ‘realisation of character can be achieved only by “taking for granted the culturally defined roles supposedly played by that character: father, businessman, friend, lover, fiancé, trade union leader, farmer, poet”’ (Alexander 2006: 58).

Placing such performances into the context of the fractured, dynamic and complex social orders of modernity (in which ‘all that is solid melts into air’) Jeffrey Alexander argues, contrary to the deliberativists, that the development of the modern public sphere has not involved the creation of a structured forum for considered debate but rather, ‘the rise of a public stage, a symbolic forum in which actors have increasing freedom to create and to project performances of their reasons, dramas tailored to audiences whose voices have become more legitimate references in political conflicts’ (2006: 51). Such performances do not automatically possess the aura of authenticity attendant on rituals in traditional society and actors must work to win legitimacy ‘as authoritative interpreters of social texts’, transforming ‘interest conflicts’ into persuasive, symbolic performances through which they present themselves as grand protagonists and ‘exemplifications of sacred religious and secular texts’ (2006: 52). The public political actor is performing the enthymeme – drawing on a repertoire of references and roles, a social imaginary, and presenting it back to the people in the context of a specific claim in the present. What the audience judges, then, is – in a specific but also literal sense – itself.  

A popular and influential genre of political writing in the medieval and renaissance periods was the so-called ‘mirror for princes’. Advice books often dedicated to a particular ruler these sought to present (through the rearticulation of common moralisms and maxims as well as principles of governance) an image of an ideal Prince in which an actual prince might come to see himself. A democratic community is not a Prince – but it certainly can become tyrannical over a part or even over the whole of itself; it too needs a mirror. It must be able to manifest and look upon itself so that it might judge itself. Plato’s quite proper concern was that the demos would be entranced by the vision of itself offered by the orators – and theirs, he thought, must always be a false and flattering mirror put before a sluggish and passive people.





I have argued that when examining those moments where political actors perform in front of people we should see the entire occasion as the performance and not confine our attention to the things which happen on the stage. Here, the analysts’ role is not that of legislators or referees, those who set the rules or those who ensure compliance with them. ‘Criticism’ is instead analogous to the role of art or theatre critic and involves judgements not of the legality of the ‘moves’ made in a performance but of its overall form and quality. It may also involve explicating the nature and context of the performance – the derivation of its practice, the ways in which it conforms to or departs from established styles and scenarios. It may mean seeking out new and overlooked kinds of performance happening away from the main stage. Above all it means trying to explore the relationship between a particular performance and the polis from which it derives and to which it contributes. A definitive feature of any political or societal regime is how it organises (or fails to organise) such speaking and arguing and there are urgent questions to ask about how new systems of communication affect not only individuals’ freedom of speech and governments’ monitoring of it but also the capacities of publics to show themselves to themselves and to exercise collective as well as individual judgement. 

Not all performances are good. That there are many terrible plays is not to be doubted but it would be precipitate to conclude that we should abolish the theatre. Similarly, that demagogues can manufacture and madden publics is not a justification for abandoning the latter. The answer to fear mongering shock-jocks lies in the formation of new stages and the cultivation of new performers for new publics. Those stages may be virtual platforms or traditional legislative arenas, in Zucotti Park or outside St. Pauls’ Cathedral. Politics is an endless ‘materialisation’ of peoples, a series of performances which take place ‘in the gap between a place where the demos exists and a place where it does not, where there are only populations individuals, employers and employees, heads of household and spouses, and so on…performing this relationship, which means first setting it up as theatre, inventing the argument, in the double logical and dramatic sense of the term’ (Ranciere, 1999: 88; as translated in Hallward, 2006: 111). 

The ‘subject’ of contemporary democracy is ‘the people’. It is on their authority – their ‘popular sovereignty’ that governments are founded and it is in their name and for their interests that states act. If what happens on the public stage is understood as the creation and transmission of ‘meaning’ of some kind then something meaningful is also being created by the audiences which do or don’t pay attention, or that go off and create a new stage somewhere else. Yet – as we all know – this ‘people’ is a fiction. ‘The people’ is not a natural or given category, the territory over which it claims authority is not fixed and contestation over who is included within it (the propertyless, women, those with a minority religion or none) is an evident fact of political history. Who the people are, what they are like – their virtues and vices, capacities and character – are open questions constantly answered by political actors of all kinds. Thus – peculiarly – ‘the people’ - the ‘subject’ of democracy - is also its object and a focal point of political action. This is why Ernesto Laclau claims that ‘the political operation par excellence is always going to be the construction of a people’ (2005: 153). Political movements try to name the people and show how they alone can speak for them. 
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